We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents arrive sequentially and each in turn chooses one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of an agent to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal disclosure policy of a planner whose goal is to maximizes social welfare. One interpretation for our result is the implementation of what is known as the 'wisdom of the crowd'. This topic has become more relevant with the rapid adaptation of the Internet over the past decade.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has proven to be a powerful channel for sharing information among agents. In doing so it has become a critical element in implementing what is known as the 'wisdom of the crowd'. Hence it is not that surprising that one of the most important recent trends in the new Internet economy is the rise of online reputation systems that collect, maintain, and disseminate reputations. A naive view is that perfect information sharing through the Internet allows for optimal learning and supports the optimal outcome. We argue that this is not the case and present here a first step toward a characterization of the optimal strategy to share information when agents behave strategically.
To examine these issues we study a novel mechanism design problem in which, contrary to what is commonly assumed, the designer is the one possessing the private information which he reveals optimally through the chosen mechanism. In particular, in our model agents arrive sequentially one after the other and each in turn chooses one action from a fixed set of actions with unknown rewards. The agent's goal is to maximize his expected rewards given the information he possesses at the time of arrival. A principal, whose interest is in maximizing the social welfare, is the only one to observe all past outcomes and can affect the agents' choices by revealing some or all of his information. His problem then is to choose an optimal disclosure/recommendation policy taking into account that the agents' short-term goals are not always in line with welfare maximization.
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